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Introduction
Applications of the Nash bargaining solution (Nash [22] ) feature prominently in economic analysis. Nash first presented his solution for bilateral problems where the feasible possibilities are described by a convex set in the utility space. Subsequently, Harsanyi [7] extended it to multilateral convex problems where coalitions are powerless (the so-called pure bargaining problems).
Harsanyi's starting point is a "consistency" condition, i.e., he argues that a bargaining solution should be "consistent" when ruling over bargaining problems with a different number of players.
As is well known, though, problems that involve more than two players are substantially more complex than those of pure bargaining, since coalitions may often play a major role.
The theory should also aim to drop the convexity assumption, either because one may be interested in extending solution concepts beyond expected utility (see Rubinstein, Safra and
Thomson [27] , and Grant and Kajii [6] ) or because, even within expected utility, randomizations may sometimes be inappropriate. See in this context Conley and Wilkie [3] and Zhou [34] , who present single-valued extensions of the Nash solution to non-convex pure bargaining problems.
Without convexity, it is difficult to maintain single-valuedness: closer to our work are Kaneko [13] , and especially Maschler, Owen and Peleg [18] and Herrero [9] , who allow set-valued solutions.
Kaneko [13] selects the global maxima of the Nash product, and Maschler, Owen and Peleg [18] and Herrero [9] concentrate on the constrained critical points of the Nash product, i.e., local maxima and minima subject to efficiency.
Believed by many to lie quite apart from Nash's bargaining theory, the prekernel is a solution that was introduced by Davis and Maschler [4] for the class of coalitional games with transferable utility (TU games). It was usually explained as a solution where each player's surplus against any other was equal (see, for example, Maschler [17] and Osborne and Rubinstein [24] ). Because player i's surplus is measured in i's utility scale and j's surplus in j's scale, it appeared that the solution were based on interpersonal comparisons of utility, thereby rendering it useless to positive applications of the theory. As a consequence, the extension of the prekernel to nontransferable (NTU) games was perceived as an uninteresting problem. 1 The TU prekernel has been misunderstood and unfairly criticized on these grounds for too long (see again references 17 and 24 on this point). Indeed, using the non-cooperative approach, Serrano [29] dispells these 3 criticisms. This paper's main actor is the Nash set. 2 The Nash set was first uncovered for NTU games in Serrano's [29] non-cooperative analysis. It is the set of payoffs where each pair of players splits the available surplus at a point where their Nash product of utility differences (with respect to the "threat point") is critical when the optimum is subject to efficiency. The induced bilateral problems (when keeping the utilities of the remaining agents fixed) have a "threat point" where each player threatens the other in the pair with forming a coalition that does not contain her. In particular, (1) for convex pure bargaining problems, these conditions yield precisely one payoff: the Nash solution; and (2) for TU games the same conditions yield a set-valued solution: the prekernel.
In this paper we follow an axiomatic approach. In the spirit of Harsanyi [7] , we investigate the implications in the model of NTU games of using Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems in conjunction with a property of internal consistency and its converse. These two are the key axioms used by Peleg [26] in order to characterize the prekernel of TU games. 3 Our main theorem is a pure axiomatization, in the sense that it is not restricted to a class where a certain solution concept is non-vacuous. We regard the existence problem and the axiomatic characterization as two completely separate issues. Theorem 1 says that, for the class of smooth NTU games, the Nash set is the only solution that satisfies consistency, converse consistency, and a set of five axioms of the Nash type imposed on the subclass of two-person smooth problems: non-emptiness, scale invariance, equal treatment if the game is TU, Pareto efficiency, and local independence. 4 Non-emptiness, Pareto efficiency and scale invariance are basic axioms and are already used by Nash [22] . The equal treatment property for TU games is a weaker requirement than Nash's original symmetry axiom since it only applies when utility is transferable.
On the other hand, local independence is stronger than Nash's "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (IIA) axiom. 5 The original formulation of the condition says that "if at a commodity allocation all agents have a common marginal rate of substitution under preference profiles u and u , then the allocation should be chosen as a socially optimal outcome for u whenever it is selected for u." The version in this paper expresses essentially the same concept in the payoff 4 space. One justification of local independence is based on informational efficiency: in order to pin down the solution, local information (about the gradient of the Pareto frontier) suffices. If the problem looks the same locally, the solution will not change. Essentially, there is no "action at a distance" in the influence of the shape of the feasible set on the location of the solution.
(See Nash [23] , p. 138). A key property of the Nash solution is that, at it, the utility elasticity of the Pareto frontier of the feasible set is 1 for every pair of agents: denoting by du i /du j the slope of the Pareto frontier and (to simplify) normalizing the disagreement point to 0, we have that at the Nash solution du i /du j = u i /u j . Thus, the Nash solution picks the point where, for every i = j, a 1% of agent i's utility is traded off efficiently for a 1% of agent j's utility. This local property is the way the Nash solution captures a concept of "fairness," and contrasts openly with bargaining solutions based on global factors in the bargaining problem (such as bargainers' aspiration levels, like in Kalai and Smorodinsky [12] ). Local independence builds in these local considerations and serves to extend naturally Nash's bargaining theory.
The axiom of consistency, first found in Harsanyi's [7] early work, was crucial in characterizing the Nash solution without the IIA axiom (Lensberg [16] ). 6 Interestingly, we will need both (consistency and the IIA-like axiom of local independence) to extend the result to non-convex and coalitional domains. In order to understand consistency, one should think of a solution as a "court" ruling over problems that, in principle, may involve a variable number of interested parties. Consider a pure bargaining problem. If the solution is consistent, there is no room for profitable appeal before the court. That is, suppose the original problem involves three parties and the court solves this problem by recommending the utility vector (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ). Suppose further that agent 3 is happy with this arrangement, but the other two would like to appeal the court's decision: "we know that agent 3 accepts your ruling, but we do not. We wish to resubmit the bilateral problem for your new consideration." If the court is consistent, it will respond by saying: "given that agent 3 was awarded u 3 , my recommendation for the bilateral problem involving agents 1 and 2 is (u 1 , u 2 )." If coalitions have power, consistency captures the same idea, but in addition, it takes into account that those who appeal may interact with those who are happy and use their resources, as long as they are "bought off" at the awarded utilities in the multilateral problem. See also Krishna and Serrano [14] for a non-cooperative use of consistency.
We also show that our seven axioms are logically independent, so that the characterization provided is tight. We think that it is good news that we are able to find a solution that satisfies (and that it is the only one to do so) all these important seven principles. The axioms are also conceptually independent, as they express quite distinct desiderata from one another.
In Theorem 2, we show that for the class of games with non-empty cores, the same axioms as in our main theorem characterize the intersection of the core and the Nash set. This is related to Moldovanu's [19] partial axiomatization of this intersection for convex assignment problems.
The Nash set should be helpful in applications, because it is a natural generalization of Nash's bargaining theory to contexts where convexity is not assumed and coalitional interaction is a relevant consideration. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while section 3 is devoted to the consistency properties of the Nash set. Section 4 contains our main result, as well as examples to show that the axioms are independent. Our result on the intersection of the core and the Nash set is the subject of Section 5. Section 6 presents examples that motivate the solution concept characterized in this paper and section 7 concludes by briefly comparing our work to the relevant literature.
The Model
Denote by IR the set of the real numbers. If N is a non-empty finite set, denote by |N | the cardinality of N , and by IR N the set of all functions from N to IR. We identify an element x ∈ IR N with an |N |-dimensional vector whose components are indexed by members of N ; thus we write x i for x(i). If x ∈ IR N and S ⊆ N , we write x S for the restriction of x to S, which is the element of IR S that associates x i with each i ∈ S.
and the interior of Y is the set
We also write
write g i (x) for the partial derivative of g at x ∈ IR S with respect to component i ∈ S, and ∇g(x)
for the gradient vector of g at x ∈ IR S .
The pair (N, V ) is a coalitional game, or simply a game, if V is a correspondence that associates with every S ⊆ N a subset V (S) ⊆ IR S such that
(1) V (S) is non-empty and closed;
and
are bounded;
For example, a pure bargaining problem and an exchange economy where agents have strictly monotone preferences fit the above assumptions.
A player is a member of N , and a non-empty subset of N is a coalition. A payoff to player i is a point of IR {i} , and a payoff profile on coalition S is a point of IR S .
The game (N, V ) is smooth if there is a differentiable representation g for V (N ) with positive gradients on ∂V (N ); namely for each i ∈ N , g i (x) > 0 at any x ∈ ∂V (N ).
A class of games is rich if it contains all two-person smooth games.
A transferable utility game, or a TU game, is a smooth game (N, V ) which is defined by a function v that associates with every coalition S a real number v(S) such that
We abuse the notation, and use (N, v) to denote the associated coalitional game.
Let Γ be a non-empty class of games. A solution on Γ is a relation σ which associates with
Definition. Let ({i, j}, V ) be a two-person smooth game. The Nash set of ({i, j}, V ) is:
where g is a representation for V ({i, j}), and
That is, the solution N consists of the critical points of the function
The expression in the definition is just a reduced form of the first order conditions of these optimization programs.
Remark 2.1. The solution N reduces to the Nash bargaining solution on the class of two-
Definition. Let Γ be a non-empty class of games. Then a solution σ on Γ satisfies non- Let (N, V ) be a game, α ∈ IR N ++ , and β ∈ IR N . For each coalition S, we define the function λ
for each x S ∈ IR S . We then define λ α,β (V ) as the correspondence that associates with every coalition S a set
That is, these two definitions simply describe positive affine transformations of the utility scales.
Definition. Let Γ be a class of games. A solution σ on Γ satisfies scale invariance if for each
On the class of two-person smooth games, N satisfies scale invariance.
Definition. Let Γ be a non-empty class of two-person smooth games. A solution σ on Γ satisfies local independence if for each ({i, j}, V ) ∈ Γ, and each x ∈ σ({i, j}, V ), we have that x ∈ σ(N, V ) whenever
where
, and g and g are representations for V ({i, j}) and V ({i, j}), respectively. 8 Local independence is stronger than Nash's axiom of "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (IIA). However, it is not harder to justify. In fact, Nash's motivation for his axiom that there should be "no action at a distance," as he phrased it, is really a justification for local independence, not for IIA. We need to work with local independence because our domain includes non-convex bargaining problems. Thus, Nash's "trick" of enclosing the bargaining feasible set in his famous right angle triangle would not help us. Note that we could formulate local independence for non-smooth problems by requiring the non-empty intersection of the sets of supporting lines. We choose to present our result in this section for smooth problems only to be consistent with the sequel (see Remark 4.2). Proof. The solution N on Γ {i,j} satisfies the five axioms listed. Now we prove the uniqueness part of the statement. Say i = 1 and j = 2. Let ({1, 2}, V ) be a two-person smooth game, and σ a solution on Γ {i,j} which satisfies the five axioms. We prove that σ({1, 2}, V ) = N ({1, 2}, V ).
By non-emptiness, there exists x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ N({1, 2}, V ). By Pareto efficiency, x ∈ ∂V ({1, 2}). By differentiability, there is a unique tangent line to the curve ∂V ({1, 2}) at x:
Define the two-person smooth game ({1, 2}, V ) by V ({1}) = V ({1}), V ({2}) = V ({2}), and
Then, since the Nash set satisfies local independence, x ∈ N ({1, 2}, V ). Note that
which is the midpoint of the segment on the line ∂V ({1, 2}) truncated by the coordinates
Hence, {x} = N ({1, 2}, V ) (see Figure 1 ).
Define the TU game ({1, 2}, w) by w({1}) = w({2}) = 0, and
By non-emptiness, Pareto efficiency and equal treatment for TU games, we have
Let α = (1/g 1 (x), 1/g 2 (x)), and β = (v 1 , v 2 ). By scale invariance,
In exactly the same way, we can show σ({1, 2},
Reduced Game Properties of the Nash Set
We introduce now a two-person "reduced game" studied by Peleg [25] . Let Π N = {P ⊆ N :
|P | = 2}, which is the set of two-person coalitions in N .
Definition. Let (N, V ) be a game, x ∈ V (N ), and P ∈ Π N . The two-person reduced game of (N, V ) with respect to P given x −P is the pair (P, V x,P ), consisting of the set P and the correspondence V x,P that associates with every S ⊆ P a subset V x,P (S) of IR P , where
for each i ∈ P , and
where we denote by x −S = x N \S for every S ⊆ N .
Thus, given a payoff vector x for the grand coalition N , it is clear what is the feasible set for the pair P in the reduced game. In addition, each player in P expects to be able to cooperate with any of the players not in P provided they are paid their components of x.
Definition. Let Γ be a non-empty class of games. Then a solution σ on Γ satisfies bilateral consistency if for each (N, V ) ∈ Γ, each x ∈ σ(N, V ), and each P ∈ Π N , (P, V x,P ) ∈ Γ and x P ∈ σ(P, V x,P ).
Bilateral consistency says that the solution should be invariant to the number of players, provided they have the expectations embodied in the bilateral reduced game. A strengthening of this property is consistency. A solution σ on a class Γ satisfies consistency if the same condition as above holds, but for all subsets P , that is, not only restricted to those subsets P of N of cardinality 2.
Definition. Let Γ be a non-empty class of games. Then a solution σ on Γ satisfies converse consistency if for each (N, V ) ∈ Γ, and each x ∈ ∂V (N ), x ∈ σ(N, V ) whenever x P ∈ σ(P, V x,P )
If a solution is converse consistent, then in order to impose it on a society, an arbitrator should simply make sure that it is imposed on every pair of agents. Consistency and its converse for NTU games were first presented in Peleg [25] in order to characterize the core. We use exactly the same axioms in this paper.
Definition. Let (N, V ) be a game. The Nash set of (N, V ) is:
where g is a representation for V (N ), and (v i (x −{i,j} ), v j (x −{i,j} )) = (max V x,{i,j} ({i}), max V x,{i,j} ({j})).
As before for the case of two players, the Nash set is the set of payoffs where each pair of players receives a critical point of the function
. If the game is TU, the representation in the definition of the first order conditions of the optimization program yields precisely the "surplus equality" equations of the prekernel.
Note that in each bilateral problem the "threat point" (v i (x −{i,j} ), v j (x −{i,j} )) consists of the maximum utilities that each of the two players could achieve without the cooperation of the other agent, provided that the payoff proposed to the grand coalition is x. This "threat point" can influence the pair's negotiations. Of course, if one is dealing with a pure bargaining problem, this point will end up being (v i , v j ), the standard "disagreement point". In addition, the payoff
x is required to be in ∂V (N ), that is, suppose that for some reason the grand coalition should stay together even if the "threat point" for some pair lies outside of V (N ) (this may be the case in a cost sharing problem with a decreasing returns technology, for example). This requirement, though, should not be argued as a drawback of the solution concept, as it can readily be adapted for any coalition structure other than N .
Remark 3.1. On a rich class of smooth games, N satisfies bilateral consistency and converse consistency. It also satisfies consistency, stronger than its bilateral version.
A Characterization of the Nash Set
We have checked that on the class of two person smooth games, the solution N satisfies nonemptiness, Pareto efficiency, equal treatment for TU games, scale invariance and local independence. We now show that for the class of games with more than two players it is uniquely characterized by the two-person versions of all these axioms together with bilateral consistency and its converse. Next we show that the seven axioms used in the characterization are logically independent.
In each example, the axiom in brackets is the one violated by the solution proposed. 
Then σ satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 1 except Pareto efficiency for two-person games. 
Then σ satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 1 except scale invariance for two-person games.
Example 4.5 [local independence]: For every two-person game (P, V ), define a(P, V ) = (a i (P, V )) i∈P by
For every (N, V ) ∈ Γ 0 , let
That is, for every pair of players in N , x P is the maximal point of the feasible set V x,P (P ) on the segment connecting (v i (x −P )) i∈P 
for every x ∈ ∂V (N ), and for each S ⊆ N \{i, j}, where
for every x ∈ ∂V (N ) if players i and j are equivalent. Now let
We can verify that σ satisfies the five axioms imposed on two-person games. If |N | = 2, then the two players in N are equivalent, and σ(N, V ) = N (N, V ).
To prove that σ satisfies converse consistency, let x ∈ ∂V (N ), and x P ∈ σ(P, V x,P ) = N (P, V x,P ) for every P ∈ Π N . Since N satisfies converse consistency, x ∈ N (N, V ). We show
Suppose that players i and j in N are equivalent. Since x ∈ ∂V (N ), we have
so that
Since x ∈ N (N, V ), we have
satisfies converse consistency.
On the other hand, σ does not satisfy bilateral consistency. Suppose that N = {1, 2, 3}, and V is a TU game defined by
v({2, 3}) = 2, and v({1, 2, 3}) = 6. Then (N, V ) has no pair of equivalent players, so that
Hence, σ does not satisfy bilateral consistency. 
Then σ satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 1 except converse consistency.
Remark 4.1:
The solution N satisfies Pareto efficiency, equal treatment for TU games, scale invariance and local independence over the class of n-person smooth games, n ≥ 2. It does not satisfy, however, non-emptiness over the same class (see Serrano [29] , Example 2, and Moldovanu [19] , p. 188). 9
Remark 4.2. Theorem 1 does not extend to non-smooth problems. Although N satisfies consistency over this class, it fails to satisfy converse consistency (see Lensberg [16] , Figure 4 , p. 339).
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We next investigate the implications of the same axioms on the class of smooth games with non-empty cores. We find that we characterize the intersection of the core and the Nash set.
Definition. Let (N, V ) be a game, S a subset of N , and x a point of IR N . Then we say that S can improve upon x if there is y ∈ V (S) such that y i > x i for all i ∈ S. The core of (N, V ) is:
There is no coalition that can improve upon x}.
Definition. Let (N, V ) be a smooth game. The intersection of the core and the Nash set of (N, V ) is:
Remark 5.1. The solution CN reduces to the Nash bargaining solution on the class of two-person smooth games ({i, j}, V ) such that V ({i, j}) is a convex set.
We can show the following in exactly the same way as for Proposition 1. Similarly, we can prove the theorem below as we have done for Theorem 1. 
Then σ satisfies all the conditions except scale invariance for two-person games in Γ c . 
Examples
This section is devoted to examine a few examples that demonstrate the usefulness of the Nash set as a solution concept.
Example 6.1. Consider the class of NTU games (N, V ) such that V (N ) is convex and where
That is, this is the class of convex pure bargaining problems. Then, N coincides with the Nash bargaining solution.
Example 6.2. Consider the following two person non-convex pure bargaining problem.
Suppose two bargainers are negotiating over how to split two dollars and the consent of both is needed to split any pie. Suppose player i's utility function for i = 1, 2 is the following: u(x i ) = x i if i's share x i ≤ 1, while u(x i ) = 4x i − 3 otherwise. Then, the reader can easily check that N consists of three points for this case:
(See Figure 2 ). That is, three possible splits of the pie are prescribed: equal division (the problem is symmetric) and two others where the risk loving agent receives 11/8, while the risk neutral one gets 5/8. It follows from our assumptions on NTU games that N is non-empty for every pure bargaining problem, convex or not.
Example 6.3. Consider the class of TU games. On this class, N coincides with the prekernel for TU games, and is thus always non-empty. As an illustration, consider the TU game at the end of Example 4.6. The Nash set (prekernel) of this game is the singleton (3, 2, 1). Figure 3 represents the reduced problems faced by the pairs of players (1, 2), (1, 3) and (2, 3) . The payoff in the Nash set splits in half the "available surplus" to each pair determined by the threat point, which is a function of the payoff awarded to the third player.
Comparisons with the Literature
Our solution concept, the Nash set, is the one uncovered non-cooperatively by Serrano [29] . It is also the same solution concept as in Maschler, Owen and Peleg [18] , Herrero [9] and Moldovanu [19] . The first two papers study the class of pure bargaining problems, and the third one concentrates on assignment problems. These two are subclasses of the general NTU model considered in this paper.
Conley and Wilkie's [3] single-valued solution is not continuous. Specifically, consider a sequence of non-convex problems that converges (in the Hausdorff topology, or in the one specified below) to a convex problem. Along the sequence this solution prescribes the Kalai and Smorodinsky solution, but "jumps" to Nash's in the limit. Instead, the Nash set is upper hemicontinuous with the following notion of convergence: consider a sequence of games (N, V k ) with representations g S k for every S ⊆ N . We say that such a sequence converges to the game (N, V ) with representations g S for every S ⊆ N if One can easily construct examples to show that the Nash set fails to satisfy lower hemicontinuity, though. This seems to challenge Herrero's [9] , but her property A5 has a misleading label, since the sequences are allowed to be chosen arbitrarily both in the domain and the range of the correspondence.
Kaneko's [13] solution picks only the global maxima of the Nash product. Therefore, it violates Nash's symmetry axiom for non-convex problems, such as in Example 6.2. Besides, the Nash solution and its extensions, as opposed to other prominent bargaining solutions, should be guided by local considerations around the solution point. Specifically, the Nash set selects those points in the Pareto frontier where the utility elasticity is 1 between every pair of players.
This property is met at local maxima and minima of the Nash product. More importantly, we are not recommending local or global extrema of a particular function: the axioms are our starting point. We have utilized axioms that are central in important characterizations of the Nash solution, investigated their implications over a larger domain, and discovered that they lead to the constrained critical points of the Nash product.
Finally, we touch on the existence question. Under our weak general assumptions, it is well known that the Nash set is non-empty in TU games and pure bargaining problems. For symmetric NTU games, the Nash set is also non-empty. The same can be said for NTU assignment games
